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COMMENTS
element of foreseeability, but because they simply could not, as a
matter of justice and fairness to all the parties involved, extend
liability to include such a situation. It is a policy decision, and
the court so states. Such an analysis is commendable and far
more to be desired than decisions which cover up the real rea-
sons behind the result with terms the ultimate definition of
which depends upon those undisclosed policy factors.Y
TORTS-RIGHT OF PRIVACY-NO RIGHT OF RECOVERY FOR
PUBLICATION CONCERNING DECEASED RELATIVES
Defendant newspaper published a report of the death of Ben
Milner in an automobile accident, describing the accident, and
mentioning the fact that he was one of a group of men who had
been indicted for theft. The deceased's widow, son and parents
instituted an action, claiming that the report violated their right
of privacy. Defendant moved for a summary judgment in the
The principal case, Resavage v. Davies, 86 A.2d 879 (Md. 1952), is to
the same effect:
* . . If such a rule [of liability] were adopted it would involve a tre-
mendous extension of liability to the world at large, not justified by
the best considered authorities.
Id. at 883.
The English courts show both sides of the argument. In Dulieu v. White
& Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669, Kennedy, J., stated:
I . . I should be sorry to adopt a rule which would bar all such
claims on grounds of policy alone, and in order to prevent the possible
success of unrighteous or groundless actions. Such a course involves
the denial of redress in meritorious cases, and it necessarily implies a
certain degree of distrust, which I do not share, in the capacity of legal
tribunals to get at the truth in this class of claims.
Id. at 681. In Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., [1925] 1 K.B. 141 (1924), Atkin,
L.J., said:
. . It may be that to negative Kennedy J.'s restriction [i.e., the
statement in the Dulieu case that the plaintiff must have suffered ap-
prehension for herself, not for another, in order to recover for resultant
physical injuries] is to increase possible actions. I think this may be
exaggerated.
Id. at 158. In his dissent in the same case, Sargant, L. J., argued:
*.. [lit would be a considerable and unwarranted extension of the
duty of owners of vehicles towards others in or near the highway, if
it were held to include an obligation not to do anything to render them
liable to harm through nervous shock caused by the sight or apprehen-
sion of damage to third person.
.. And the extent of this extra liability is necessarily both wide
and indefinite....
Id. at 163.
17. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 312, comment e, 313, caveat (1934). It is
interesting to note that the RESTATEMENT has refused to take a stand on
the question whether or not the scope of liability as drawn in the American
cases, or in the English cases, is correct.
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trial court, and the motion was granted. On appeal, held: af-
firmed. The common law of 1841, unless altered or repealed by
statute, is controlling in Texas,' and since the right of privacy
was not recognized at common law, it is not recognized in Texas.2
The problem of the existence of the right of privacy has not
been treated uniformly in all jurisdictions. Some courts hal'e
refused to recognize it, apparently on the ground that it was
unrecognized at common law, and therefore can be created only
by the legislature.3 Other courts recognize the right of privacy
as a constitutional or an inherent right, or extend established
doctrines of the common law to include it.- In three states a
limited right of privacy is created by statute.* Other jurisdic-
tions have succeeded, at least for a time, in avoiding the problem
of recognition by holding in cases where the problem has arisen
that even if such a right existed, it had not been violated under
the facts of those cases.6 In the principal case, however, the court
decided that there is no right of privacy in the state without
examining the question of its violation. Whether the principal
case is definitive of the status of the right of privacy in Texas
is not absolutely certain; one Texas Court of Civil Appeals case
seems to be clearly inconsistent with the principal case,7 and
another Civil Appeals case may be inconsistent."
1. TEx. STAT., REV. Civ. art. 1 (1948).
2. Milner v. Red River Valley Publishing Co., 249 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1952).
3. Henry v. Cherry & Webb Co., 30 R.I. 13, 73 Atl. 97 (1909); Hillman
v. Star Publishing Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac. 594 (1911). New York
apparently recognized the right of privacy in Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y.
434, 42 N.E. 22 (1895), but in the later case of Roberson v. Rochester Fold-
ing Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902), the court flatly stated
that there was no right of privacy in New York. Subsequently, a limited
right of privacy was created by the legislature. N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW
§§50, 51.
4. See Nizer, The Right of Privacy: A Half Century's Developments, 39
MicH. L. REV. 526 (1941).
5. N.Y. CrVm RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 103-4-7, 103-
4-8, 103-4-9 (1943); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-650 (1950).
6. Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn.
1948); Elmhurst v. Shoreman Hotel, 58 F. Supp. 484 (D.D.C. 1945), af'd,
153 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1946) ; Thayer v. Worcester Post Co., 284 Mass. 160,
187 N.E. 292 (1933); Lewis v. Physicians and Dentists Credit Bureau, 27
Wash. 2d 267, 177 P.2d 896 (1947).
7. Hawks v. Yancey, 265 S.W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) (injunction was
granted which restrained defendant from publicizing his past illicit rela-
tions with plaintiff or annoying her).
8. Meadows v. First National Bank of Harlingen, 149 S.W.2d 591 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1941) (right of privacy not violated by action on note already
paid).
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The principal case, however, must be differentiated, both fac-
tually and doctrinally, from the ordinary right of privacy cases
in that it is concerned with the right to be free from unwarranted
publicity about deceased relatives, the relational right of privacy,
which is a separate right in the living relatives, distinct from the
ordinary right of privacy of the publicized individual. Although
the prevailing view is that an action for the invasion of the right
of privacy does not survive to the estate of the publicized indi-
vidual,9 this rule does not bar recovery by relatives for violations
of the relational right. This is clearly illustrated by the case of
Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital,- in which parents recovered
for an unauthorized publication of a photograph of their de-
ceased malformed child, both the photographing and the publica-
tion having taken place after the death of the child. The concept
of the relational right is relatively new, and although the Baze-
more case is the only case actually allowing recovery solely on
the ground of a violation of that right, other courts have in-
dicated their willingness to allow recovery for its violation.".
Of course, the relational right must be subject to at least the
same limitations as the ordinary right of privacy. One of these
limitations is that the freedom of the press to publish news of
public interest must be paramount,12 and this limitation has
been applied to deny recovery in at least four cases involving
the relational right.- In addition, another restriction on the
9. Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491(1939); Wyatt v. Hall's Portrait Studio, 71 Misc. 199, 128, N.Y.S. 247 (Sup.
Ct. 1911). For a collection of cases parallel and to the same effect, see
Note, 41 ILL. L. REV. 114 (1946). Contra: Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co.,
63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945).
10. 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930).
11. Clayman v. Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543 (1940) (husband deemed
proper party plaintiff along with wife, in action to restrain use of pictures
of wife taken without their consent). See discussion of Douglass v. Stokes,
149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849 (1912) in Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299
S.W. 967 (1927). See: Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 253, 37 So.2d 118,
121 (1948) (dicta recognizing relational right).
12. Corliss v. E. W. Walker Co., 64 Fed. 280 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894); Berg
v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn. 1948);
Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So.2d 118 (1948); Metter v. Los Angeles
Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491 (1939); Jones v. Herald Post
Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W.2d 972 (1929); Kelley v. Post Publishing Co., 98
N.E.2d 286 (Mass. 1951); Thayer v. Worcester Post Co., 284 Mass. 160,
187 N.E. 292 (1933); Smith v. Suratt, 7 Alaska 416 (1926).
13. Corliss v. E. W. Walker Co., 64 Fed. 280 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894); Smith
v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So.2d 118 (1948); Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner,
35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491 (1939); Kelley v. Post Publishing Co., 98
N.E.2d 286 (Mass. 1951).
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relational right of privacy seems to have been implicitly accepted.
It is that a plaintiff can recover for a violation of his relational
right of privacy only if the deceased himself could have recovered
in he were alive.3.
An application of this analysis to the principal case indicates
that even if Texas did recognize the right of privacy the plaintiffs
could not recover. Automobile accidents have been held so news-
worthy that publications concerning them have not been deemed
to be violations of the right of privacy.15 It has also been held
that information concerning those connected with the judicial
processes could not be a violation, 6 and included in this category
are involuntary participants in criminal actions.1 One court
has said that a right of privacy cannot be claimed in connection
with events which could not remain private by operation of law
and that publication of information on the public records could
not violate anyone's right of privacy. 8 It should be noted, how-
ever, that a report of an event may not be a violation of privacy
if made for news purposes, while a report of the same event,
if made for commercial or entertainment purposes, will be a
violation. 19
In view of these limitations on the ordinary and relational
right of privacy, it would seem that although the result in the
principal case was correct, the court, in justifying its decision,
did not have to go so far as to say flatly that no right of privacy
existed in Texas.
14. Corliss v. E. W. Walker Co., 64 Fed. 280 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894); Smith
vs. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So.2d 118 (1948); Metter v. Los Angeles Ex-
aminer, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491 (1939); Bazemore v. Savannah
Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930); Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230
Ky. 227, 18 S.W.2d 972 (1929); Douglass v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W.
849 (1912); Kelley v. Post Publishing Co., 98 N.E.2d 286 (Mass. 1951).
15. Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3rd Cir. 1951);Kelley v. Post Publishing Co., 98 N.E.2d 286 (Mass. 1951).
16. Estill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 186 F.2d 1017 (7th Cir. 1951); Berg
v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn. 1948); Smith
v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So.2d 118 (1948) (will as publc record); Cover-
stone v. Davies, 239 P.2d 876 (Cal. App. 1952); Metter v. Los Angeles
Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491 (1939) (coroner's report of
suicide); Thayer v. Worcester Post Co., 284 Mass. 160, 187 N.E. 292 (1933) ;
Martin v. Dorton, 50 So.2d 391 (Miss. 1951). Contra: Melvin v. Reid, 112
Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
17. Ehnhurst v. Pearson, 153 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
18. Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491(1939).
19. Leverton v. Curtis Publishin Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3rd Cir. 1951);
Reed v. Real Detective Publishing o., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945);
Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
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